Guidelines: Cease and Desist Agreement for cartel cases ("TCC")

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PRESENTATION

The Guidelines for the negotiation of Cease and Desist Agreements (“TCC” for its acronym in Portuguese) consolidate the best practices and procedures usually adopted during the negotiations of TCCs with the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) in cartel cases. Their objective is to provide an institutional framework for future negotiations and to keep record of the institutional memory acquired by CADE in TCC negotiations and to be used by public sector employees, attorneys, and for the society as a standard regarding the procedures of this relevant activity of competition policy.

Although the Guidelines only address procedures in TCC negotiations in cartel cases, a TCC is a legal instrument that can also be used in investigations concerning other violations under Law nº 12.529/2011. However, the parameters of such negotiations are not necessarily bound by the same procedures and criteria described herein.

This document is not binding and does not consist in a rule, statute or bylaw (i.e., it does not alter provisions of CADE’s Internal Regulations - RICADE). The conducts and procedures described herein can be altered at CADE’s discretion, depending on the circumstances of the cases at hand.

The structure of the Guidelines follows the main requirements for the signing of TCCs, pursuant to Articles 85 of Law nº 12.529/2011 and Articles 184 to 189 of RICADE:

(I) Cooperation;

(II) Pecuniary Contribution;

(III) Acknowledgement of participation in the investigated conduct; commitment not to practice it again and other measures; and

(IV) Main templates of agreements used by CADE in TCC negotiations.

Finally, TCCs executed in accordance with the parameters herein do not bind CADE to the same parameters for the decision criteria and calculation of penalty of other Defendants within the same administrative proceeding.
INTRODUCTION

Provided for in Article 85 of Law no. 12.529/2011, a Cease and Desist Agreement is an agreement executed between CADE and the companies and/or individuals investigated for violation of the economic order, under which the antitrust authority agrees to halt investigations against TCC signatories as long as the signatories comply with the terms of the referred agreement and agree to the commitments expressly provided thereunder.

The regulation of TCC negotiation procedures are provided for in RICADE Article 184 et seq. Under that rule, until the case is submitted to the Administrative Tribunal for ruling, the TCC is negotiated with the General Superintendence of CADE (“SG/CADE”). If the case is already at the Administrative Tribunal for ruling, the proposal is negotiated with the Reporting Commissioner of the case.

The proposals are received in an order that is the same in the SG/CADE and the Tribunal, through a system of markers that takes into account the order of presentation of the interested Parties before the authority in charge of procedural instruction. After the receipt of a certificate containing the marker, the interested party files the TCC Request within 5 (five) days, formally declaring its interest in starting negotiations. Failure to comply with the deadline results in loss of validity of the certificate containing the marker of the interested party. The interested Parties may file the TCC Request directly (without the marker request). In this event, a withdrawal would result in the loss of the right to present the request in the same proceeding, in accordance with article 85, paragraph 4 of Law 12.529/2011.

Upon the proposal of the signature of a TCC with SG/CADE, the General Superintendent determines a period for negotiations, which, as a rule, is of 60 (sixty) days, and can be renewed for other periods depending on the circumstances of the individual case. In the case of a TCC filed at the Administrative Tribunal, the negotiation period consists of 30 (thirty) days, which can be renewed by the Reporting Commissioner for additional 30 (thirty) days. It should be noted that in negotiations with the Administrative Tribunal and especially in negotiations with the General Superintendence, the renewal of the TCC’s deadlines must comply with public interest in the course of the negotiation, according to the circumstances of the factual case, taking into account that an extension of the deadline may create a disincentive for the quick and total compliance with the duty of collaboration of the interested Parties.

1 The request may be filed by electronic means, through the Electronic Information System (SEI), by a specific form for this purpose.
2 The request may be filed by electronic means, through the Electronic Information System (SEI), by a specific form for this purpose.
party. In this sense, it must be noted that the TCC does not suspend the conduct of the proceeding; both the time of the proposal and the conclusion of the agreement affect the procedure and, therefore, the convenience of the agreement. Thus, the authority shall observe if the extensions are not merely a delaying tactic, and when verifying an unnecessary delay, it shall consider the convenience of continuing the negotiation or the circumstances of the delay when calculating the discount to be applied in the amount of the pecuniary contribution.³

A “Negotiation Commission” is constituted for the negotiations, and it shall be composed of at least 3 (three) members, who shall conduct the negotiations and forward the request to the Administrative Tribunal with a suggestion of homologation or rejection of the proposal. Under Article 179, §3 of RICADE, the terms of the proposal, the procedure and the negotiation process may receive restricted access classification. Regarding the cases of agreement, combination, manipulation or arrangement among competitors (as it is the case of cartels, the subject of the Guidelines), a TCC must fulfill the following requirements:

(i) If the TCC is filed before the SG/CADE, cooperation of the party within the investigation and the administrative proceedings, under Article 186 of RICADE. This cooperation shall happen under the following circumstances:

   a. At the time of the TCC's negotiation and execution, by means of the presentation of reports containing information and documents that help the SG/CADE identify other participants in the conduct and that prove the violation. The reports of the Proponent are provided in a document called History of Conduct (“HC”). The HC must contain the description of the anticompetitive conduct, as considered by the SG/CADE, based on the information and documents presented by the TCC Proponent. The HC is a document prepared and signed by the SG/CADE when the TCC is approved. The HC is not signed by the Proponent or his/her counsel. The attachments to the HC are the documents that substantiate the reports of the Proponent. Even after the approval, the HC and its attachments are treated as documents of restricted access by CADE, in which case they shall compose a separate brief that can only be accessed by the other investigated parties. Depending on the circumstances of a specific case and in case of concordance of the parties or judicial enforcement, the documents can become available to the public.

   b. After the signing of a TCC, during the course of the Administrative Proceeding, the Party cooperates through clarifications that may be

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³ This matter is extremely relevant considering that, according to CADE’s jurisprudence and the provisions of the Guidelines, the update of the pecuniary contribution calculation, based on the SELIC rate, occurs before the TCC request, enabling the party to delay the negotiations if the authority does not control it properly.
requested by the authority and by procedural aid that the authority may need and that can be offered by the Party.

(ii) Payment of pecuniary contribution to the Diffuse Rights Fund (“FDD” for its acronym in Portuguese), as provided under Articles 85, §1, III of Law nº 12.529/2011 and Article 184, caput, of RICADE. The contribution is based on the value of the expected fine, on which a percentage reduction is applied, varying in accordance to the to the scope and usefulness of the cooperation provided by the Party and the time the TCC is proposed, as set forth in the provision of the Article 187, sub-paragraphs I, II, III and Article 188 of RICADE:

a. If the TCC is filed right after the beginning of an Administrative Proceeding and before the submission of the case to the Administrative Tribunal for judgment. (i.e., during the phase of procedural instruction at SG/CADE), the pecuniary contribution is calculated based on the expected fine, upon which are applied:

i. a 30% to 50% reduction for the first TCC proponent;

ii. a 25% to 40% reduction for the second TCC proponent;

iii. a reduction of up to 25% for the other TCC proponents; and

b. If the TCC is proposed after the case is submitted to the Administrative Tribunal for judgment, the pecuniary contribution is calculated based on the expected fine, upon which a reduction of up to 15% is applied.

(iii) Establishment of the value of the fine in the event of total or partial non-compliance with the obligations undertaken;

(iv) Acknowledgement of participation in the investigated conduct by the party, according to Article 185 of RICADE;

(v) Specification of the obligations of the TCC Proponent to not practice the investigated conduct or its harmful effects, according to §1 of Article 85 of Law nº 12.529/2011.

Finally, it is important to note that, unlike a Leniency Agreement4, a TCC does not result in benefits for criminal liability. However, if the party interested in signing a TCC with CADE also wishes to simultaneously negotiate a plea bargain agreement

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4 A Leniency Agreement is available only to the first agent to report the collective anticompetitive conduct (Article 86, §1, sub-paragraph I of Law nº 12.529/2011), whose benefits, that can culminate in total immunity, are both administrative and criminal (Article 86, §4 combined with article 87 of Law nº 12.529/2011).
with the Public Prosecutor and/or the Federal Police (pursuant to Law 12.850/2013), the SG/CADE may help the TCC proponents with such communication.

I. COOPERATION

Cooperation is a requirement for the signing of TCCs when the case is still in progress at the SG/CADE, as put forward in Articles 186 and 187 of RICADE, *in verbis*:

Art. 186. In investigations of agreement, combination, manipulation or arrangement among competitors, the final proposal forwarded by the General Superintendence to the President of the Tribunal, pursuant to Article 181, §4 of these Internal Rules, shall necessarily count on the cooperation of the party with procedural instruction.

Art. 187. The analysis of pecuniary contribution in TCC proposals under Article 186 of these Internal Rules shall take into account the *scope and usefulness* of the cooperation of the party with procedural instruction *and the time the proposal is presented*, subject, when they can be estimated and if the TCC is signed, to the following parameters:

I - percentage reduction between 30% and 50% of the expected fine for the first Proponent who proposes a TCC within an investigation of a given conduct;

II - percentage reduction between 25% and 40% of the expected fine for the second Proponent who proposes a TCC within an investigation of a given conduct;

III - percentage reduction of up to 25% of the expected fine for the subsequent Proponents of a TCC within an investigation of a given conduct.

Although it is not a requirement for the signing of a proposed TCC when the case is already at the Administrative Tribunal for judgment, depending on the circumstances of individual cases and according to CADE’s sense of convenience and opportunity, cooperation may also be requested in this phase.

The rule transcribed above determines that the analysis of cooperation shall take into consideration the scope and usefulness, as well as the time when the proposal is presented. For this reason, the referred topics shall be detailed in Section I.1 (Scope and usefulness of the cooperation) and in Section I.2 (The procedural timing of the cooperation).

In order to provide predictability on the quantification of the cooperation for the definition of the applicable discount, Section I.3 presents a non-exhaustive and non-binding set of parameters considered by CADE in such analysis.
It is important to state that the analysis of cooperation is taken into consideration for the calculation of the discount percentages for the pecuniary contribution, and not for the definition of the expected fine, which is the initial basis for the calculation of contribution.

CADE states that all the information and documents presented by the Proponent in the course of TCC negotiations shall be treated as confidential and shall have its access restricted to the Proponent, its attorneys and CADE’s officers that participate in the negotiation process. Upon signing of the TCC, the information and documents presented by the Proponents may be accessed by the other Defendants in the Administrative Proceeding and by persons authorized by CADE, under the rules of access to information contained in RICADE.

If the TCC is not signed, the information and documents presented in the context of the negotiation shall be returned to the Proponents or destroyed (including information recorded in electronic media) and shall not be used for any purposes by the authorities that have had access to them. This does not prevent the authorities from using information and documents that come to their knowledge by any other means in the course of the investigation in progress at CADE.

Finally, upon signing of the TCC, the Proponent shall continue to cooperate with the procedural instruction, reporting subsequent new documents and information to CADE, under penalty of breach of the agreement.

I.1 Scope and usefulness of the cooperation

In analyzing the scope and usefulness of the cooperation presented by the Party(ies) CADE applies, by analogy, the criteria for analysis of cooperation in Leniency Agreements, provided for in Law n.º 12.529/2011, namely:

Art. 86. CADE, by means of the General Superintendence, may enter into leniency agreements, and may terminate any punitive action of the public administration or reduce one (1) to two thirds (2/3) of the applicable penalty, under the terms of this article, with individuals or legal entities that violate the economic order, provided that they effectively cooperate with the investigations and administrative proceedings, and that from such cooperation results:

I – the identification of other agents involved in the violation; and

II – the attainment of information and documents proving the investigated violation.

Thus, there are two main criteria assessed by CADE in terms of the scope and usefulness of the cooperation in a TCC negotiation: the identification of other
CADE considers these two criteria as conditions for the signing of a TCC with the SG/CADE. Therefore, the party interested in signing a TCC with the SG/CADE must be able to submit to the authority all the documents in its possession and all the information of which it might be aware that can lead to the identification of those involved and prove the violation. The absence of these requirements may lead to the rejection of a TCC proposal. The depth of the cooperation under these two criteria and other forms of cooperation is considered in the discount of the financial penalty, as detailed later.

It is important to emphasize, once more, that the practices and procedures herein described may be altered at CADE’s discretion, depending on the circumstances of individual cases.

I.1.1 Identification of the participants in the violation

The scope and usefulness of the cooperation in a TCC negotiation will be considered by CADE to the extent that the Party identifies the participants in the violation. Therefore, CADE considers such cooperation to be broader and more useful when it brings additional information to the evidence already available in the investigation. This can be done both through the indication of other companies and/or individuals not yet identified by CADE, or through provision of information about the companies and/or individuals already identified (e.g.: current address, professional history, market share, participation in the conduct, etc.).

It is important to state that the degree of participation in the conduct is not considered a criterion for the application of the discount, but it will be taken into account when calculating the percentage of the applicable expected fine.

In this respect, the following increasing bands of cooperation in the TCC can be established, concerning the identification of participants in the violation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>If the Party indicates participants already identified by CADE and presents new information about the unidentified participants; or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>If the Party only indicates the participants already identified by CADE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I.1.2 Provision of information and documents that prove the violation

I.1.2.1 Information that proves the violation

The scope and usefulness of the cooperation in TCC negotiations will be considered by CADE to the extent that the Party presents information about the investigation, generally consolidated by the SG/CADE in the History of Conduct (HC).

In evaluating the scope and usefulness of the cooperation, CADE considers that the HC should ideally contain, at the end of the negotiations, the following information:

(i) Participation of the TCC Proponent and other participants in the investigated violation, specifying the level of participation of each party involved in the conduct (see I.1.1);
(ii) Functioning/dynamics of the anticompetitive conduct;
(iii) Duration of the anticompetitive conduct;
(iv) Means by which competitors exchanged information (meeting, phone calls, chance meetings, etc.), place and date of such contacts;
(v) Subjects addressed in the contacts among competitors;
(vi) Clients affected by the conduct;
(vii) Direct or potential effects in Brazil, when applicable;
(viii) Products/services object of the violation and the functioning of the affected market.

In case of information that contradicts what is already contained in the file, such information shall be thoroughly explained and supported by documents. It is important to state that the mere provision of information that is not new and/or does not contribute to the investigation may result in rejection of the TCC proposal.

In this respect, the following increasing bands of cooperation in the TCC can be established, concerning the provision of information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Provided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The information provided is more comprehensive than the one provided by the Leniency and/or the facts known by CADE; or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The information provided is similar to the Leniency report available and/or of the facts known by CADE; or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The information provided is less comprehensive than the report provided by the Leniency and/or of the facts known by CADE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I.1.2.2 Documents that prove the violation

The scope and usefulness of the cooperation in TCC negotiation will be considered by CADE to the extent that the Party presents documents that prove the anticompetitive conduct subject to the investigation. They can also be mentioned in the History of Conduct (I.1.2.1). The scope and usefulness of such documents will depend on their correlation with the information provided and, especially, whether they demonstrate the investigated violation. In this respect, CADE considers that the presentation of documents is an important element concerning cooperation. Except for specific situations, cooperation that contains only reports will not be deemed appropriate, nor will it avail reasonable discount, and can even lead to the rejection of the TCC.

The TCC Proponent will present all the documents in his/her possession deemed apt to prove the reported violation. Some examples of documents most commonly received by CADE as proof of the violation reported or under investigation are the following:

(i) bilateral e-mails between competitors;
(ii) unilateral e-mails between persons from the same company reporting the arrangements among competitors;
(iii) correspondence among competitors;
(iv) unilateral correspondence among individuals of the same company reporting arrangements among competitors;
(v) exchange of electronic messages (SMS, whatsapp, etc.) among competitors and/or containing information about arrangements among them;
(vi) handwritten notes containing information about arrangements among competitors;
(vii) records of conversations among competitors and/or containing information about the arrangements in which the Party is an interlocutor;
(viii) tables containing information on market division, division of clients and/or division of production among competitors, or even indication of prices and/or bids to be presented by each competitor in public or private tenders;
(ix) diaries containing record of meetings among competitors and/or information about arrangements among them;
(x) general evidence of meetings (minutes of meetings, outlook or other electronic agenda commitments, booking of room, hotel reservations, expense and travel reports, etc.);
(xi) phone records demonstrating calls between competitors;
(xii) business cards;
(xiii) record of entry into buildings;
(xiv) notices and minutes of decision of bids; etc.

The documents mentioned above are merely examples of evidence that may prove the existence of an unlawful practice, and will be analyzed by the authority according to the probationary set presented and included in the documents of the investigation.

It is important to note that to ensure that the electronic and physical documents presented by a TCC proponent have higher probative value, technical care must be taken in collecting the evidence. As a rule, the proponent must keep record of the chain of custody of the electronic and physical documents that are submitted to CADE, i.e., the chronological history of the evidence, presenting specific information of the individual responsible for the collection.

Additionally, in the case of electronic documents, the TCC Proponent must be able to describe the method of extraction of evidence in detail, which should be done, whenever possible, in a way that best ensures the integrity and the chain of custody of the material. Whenever possible, the TCC Proponent must preserve the hard disks or original equipment (from which the information was extracted) and/or their authenticated forensic image preserved, without alterations. CADE will evaluate, in each case, the care taken to ensure the fidelity of the documents to the original. If necessary, the proponent may request more detailed information on methods of evidence extraction and description of procedures to CADE’s technical team.

Under the criteria of convenience and opportunity, CADE may also request the conduction of interviews with the individuals proposing the TCC to obtain further information and details about the documents presented.

In this respect, the following increasing bands of cooperation in the TCC can be established, concerning the presentation of documents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Band of Cooperation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Documents that prove the violation and are broader and more useful than the ones presented in the Leniency/facts known by CADE; or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents prove the violation; or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents partially prove the violation; or</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents presented do not prove the violation, but help with the procedural instruction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Guidelines
Cease and Desist
Agreement for cartel cases (“TCC”)
I.2 The procedural timing of the cooperation

When analyzing the procedural timing of presenting a TCC proposal as a criterion valued in the cooperation presented by the Party(ies), CADE considers that the sooner the TCC proposal is presented, the greater is the discount to the Proponent. This is because a TCC can considerably reduce procedural costs both for the Public Administration and for the Proponent, even more so the earlier it occurs in the investigations. Additionally, a TCC signed in the early stages of the proceeding will possibly be more useful to the investigation, adding information still unknown or little understood by the authority, therefore indicating the best path for the continuation of the investigation. Consequently, the duration of the investigation can be shortened.\(^5\)

In this respect, in view of the procedural phases of discovery at the SG/CADE, the following increasing bands of cooperation in the TCC can be established concerning the timing of the requirement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TCC requested before the beginning of Administrative Proceeding (&quot;AP&quot;):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>・ TCC presented up to three months from administrative and/or legal actions of investigative nature, the initiation of Administrative Inquiry (AI), or from other form of knowledge about the existence of the investigation by the Defendant;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>・ TCC presented between the end of the aforementioned period and the initiation of the AP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TCC presented between the initiation of the AP and the end of the defense period:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>・ TCC presented before the proof that the Party is served to the proceeding is attached to the file;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>・ TCC presented between the end of the aforementioned period and the end of the defense period.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TCC presented between the end of the defense period and the order to present new arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>・ TCC presented up to six months from the end of the defense period;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>・ TCC presented between the 6th month subsequent to the end of the defense period and the order to present new arguments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\) On the contrary, a TCC executed at a more advanced phase of the proceeding - for example, at the Administrative Tribunal and with little advance in regards to the ruling of the case - has little or no possibility of adding information that is relevant for the comprehension of the conduct or of the participation of the Defendants. Its main usefulness in terms of reduction of costs would be achieved in an earlier solution of the proceeding, avoiding future legal disputes.
It is important to note that, pursuant to Article 179 of RICADE, a TCC proposal can only be presented to the SG/CADE until such time as the proceeding is sent to the Tribunal for judgement. Combining this regulatory provision with the idea that a TCC only cooperates with the investigations while the case is still at the SG/CADE, CADE clarifies that it shall not accept a TCC proposal at the SG/CADE after the procedural instruction ends and the period for presentation of new arguments by the Defendants begins, as provided for in Article 73 of Law nº 12.529/11. However, this does not prevent the presentation of a TCC at the Tribunal, under the terms and conditions provided for in Articles 182 and 188 of RICADE.

I.3 The method to quantify the cooperation for the purpose of defining the applicable discount

Considering Sections I.1 and I.2 above, CADE clarifies the method used and the parameters deemed most relevant by the authority to quantify the cooperation for the purpose of defining the applicable discount, which are non-exhaustive and non-binding. Other factors not provided for in the methodology and parameters presented herein may be used by CADE to increase or reduce the discount, accordingly to the circumstances of the case.

When quantifying the cooperation, CADE goes from the minimum level of the discount band in which the Party is positioned, moving to a sum of points as certain parameters of cooperation are fulfilled or not fulfilled. The minimum and maximum discounts are provided for in Articles 186 and 187 of RICADE.

However, if the set of elements brought as cooperation by the Party is deemed insufficient, CADE may reject the TCC proposal.

Moreover, RICADE prevents the discount granted under a TCC from exceeding the discount already granted in a previous TCC already executed in the same proceeding (Article 189 of RICADE), especially when there is an intersection between the discount bands.

In this respect, CADE presents in the table below the method used to quantify the cooperation for the purpose of defining the applicable discount under the TCC. The table indicates the amount of points to which the Proponent is entitled, taking into consideration each parameter of cooperation evaluated by CADE, and also the place in line of the TCC Request. Each point attributed to the Proponent’s cooperation corresponds to one percentage point within the discount band in which it is positioned.
It is important to note that the points indicated in the table are the maximum points a Proponent may be entitled to in each criterion, and that depending on the quality of the cooperation under analysis, it may receive a lower score.

Furthermore, the table is merely indicative and given the subjective nature of evaluations, CADE shall take into consideration the characteristics of each individual case for its analyses. Additionally, in each case, specific criteria not identified in the table may be used to increase or reduce the final discount. Furthermore, if CADE verifies an unnecessary or unjustified delay of the TCC negotiations (caused by the parties), this may entail the non-renewal or termination of the negotiation’s deadlines and may even impact the calculation of discounts in the pecuniary contribution resulted from cooperation, if it is understood that even with the delay the agreement remain convenient and appropriate.

The table below contains four calculation parameters: (i) identification of the participants in the violation; (ii) provision of information about the violation; (iii) provision of documents that prove the violation; and (iv) procedural timing. Each parameter receives a score from zero to the maximum score foreseen, depending on whether the Proponent is the first, second or third (and subsequent).6 The sum of the scores in each parameter corresponds to the total score estimated for each Proponent.7 A minimum score corresponds to the minimum percentage discount provided for in RICADE to position each participant according to the order in which the proposals are made; a maximum score corresponds to the maximum percentage discount for each proponent.8

Although collaboration in the TCC proposal is not mandatory within the scope of the Administrative Tribunal, it should be noted that, at the Reporting Commissioner’s discretion, the table below may also be used for the calculation of discounts applied in the cases containing cooperation in a TCC negotiated within the Tribunal.

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6 For example, within the parameter “identification of the participants in the violation”, the first proponent shall receive a score from zero to three; the second from zero to two; the third from zero to one. The scores provided for in each parameter are not added. They go from zero to the maximum score provided for in the parameter.

7 For example, if the first proponent gets maximum score in all the parameters, at the end it will have added 20 points.

8 For example, if the first proponent scores zero, it receives the minimum percentage discount provided for in RICADE, which is 30%; if it scores 20 points, the percentage discount received shall be the maximum, i.e., 50%. If the second proponent scores zero, it receives the minimum percentage discount provided for in RICADE, which is 25%; if the score is 15, the maximum percentage discount shall be granted, i.e., 40%.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAMETERS</th>
<th>POSITION IN TCC REQUEST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identification of participants in the violation</strong></td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If it indicates the same participants already identified by CADE and presents additional information regarding participants that have not yet been identified;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If it only indicates the participants already identified by CADE.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Presentation of information about the violation</strong></th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third and subsequent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Report that is more comprehensive than that of the Leniency(^9) or of the facts known by CADE; or</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report that is similar to that of the Leniency or to the facts known by CADE; or</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report that is less comprehensive than that of the Leniency or of the facts known by CADE.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Provision of documents that prove the violation</strong></th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third and Subsequent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Documents prove the violation and are broader and more useful than those presented in the Leniency / facts known by CADE;</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents prove the violation; or</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents partially prove the violation; or</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents presented do not prove the violation but help clarify the facts or the circumstances of the violation; or</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^9\) A more comprehensive report than that of a beneficiary of Leniency Agreement does not necessarily imply breach of the Leniency Agreement by the beneficiary due to lack of information. The Leniency obligation is to present to the authority all the facts known by the company or individual. It is natural that in some cases the beneficiary of a Leniency Agreement may not able to report or demonstrate certain facts. However, the verification that it withheld or was untruthful about certain facts may result in the breach of the referred legal instrument.
II. PECUNIARY CONTRIBUTION

The payment of pecuniary contribution to the FDD as a requirement for execution of TCC is provided for in Article 85 of Law 12.529/11 for cases of cartel and of influence in uniform commercial practice (Article 36, §3, sub-paragraphs I and II of Law 12.529/11), *in verbis*:

Art. 85. In the administrative proceedings referred to in items I, II and III of Art. 48 of this Law, CADE may obtain from the defendant a cease-and-desist agreement related to the practice under investigation or its harmful effects, if duly
grounded, for convenience and at the proper time, and if it understands that such agreement complies with the interests protected by law.

§ 1 The agreement shall contain the following elements:

I - specification of the defendant’s obligations not to practice the investigated activity or its harmful effects, as well as obligations deemed applicable;

II – the setting of fines to be paid in case of failure to comply, in full or in part, with the obligations undertaken;

III - the setting of pecuniary contributions to be paid to the Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Rights, when applicable.

§ 2 In regard to the investigation of a violation related to or resulting from the conduct set forth in items I and II of § 3 of Article 36 of this Law, among the obligations referred to in Item I of § 1 of this Article it shall be an obligation to pay to the Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Rights a monetary value that cannot be less than the minimum required under Article 37 of this Law.

§ 3 (VETOED).

§ 4 The proposed Cease-and-Desist Agreement may only be submitted once.

§ 5 The proposed Cease-and-Desist Agreement may be confidential.

§ 6 The presentation of the Cease-and-Desist Agreement does not suspend the progress of the administrative proceeding.

§ 7 The Cease-and-Desist Agreement shall be public, and it shall be published at CADE’s website within five (5) days of its signature.

§ 8 The Cease-and-Desist Agreement constitutes an instrument enforceable in Court.

§ 9 The Administrative Proceeding shall be suspended while the Cease-and-Desist Agreement is being complied with and it shall be filed at the end of the established deadline, if all the conditions set forth therein are satisfied.

§ 10 The suspension of Administrative Proceedings referred to in § 9 of this Article shall relate only to the defendant who has signed the commitment, and proceedings will follow their regular course in relation to the other Defendants.
§ 11 If the Cease-and-Desist Agreement is not complied with, CADE shall apply the sanctions provided for therein and determine the continuation of the Administrative Proceeding and other administrative and legal measures for its enforcement.

§ 12 The conditions of the Cease-and-Desist Agreement may be changed by CADE if it is proved to be excessively burdensome for the defendant, provided that the change does not cause damages to third parties or to the public.

§ 13 The proposal for the signing of a Cease-and-Desist Agreement shall be rejected when the authority does not reach an understanding with defendants regarding its terms.

§ 14 CADE shall define, by resolution, the additional rules applicable to the Cease-and-Desist Agreement.

§ 15 The provisions contained in Article 50 of this Law shall apply to the Cease-and Desist Agreement. (our highlights)

The pecuniary contribution will necessarily be included in the TCC, which will be publicized (Article 85, §§ 1 and 7 of Law 12.529/11). In turn, for the purpose of calculating the pecuniary contribution in cartel cases and in cases of influence of uniform commercial practice, the Law determines that the value must not be lower than the minimum value of the fines, indicated in Article 37, which determines, *in verbis*:

Art. 37. A violation of the economic order subjects the ones responsible to the following penalties:

I - in the case of a company, a fine of one tenth percent (0.1%) to twenty percent (20%) of the gross sales of the company, group or conglomerate, in the last fiscal year before the establishment of the administrative proceeding, in the field of the business activity in which the violation occurred, *which will never be less than the advantage obtained, when the estimation thereof is possible*;

II - in the case of other individuals or legal entities governed by public or private law, as well as any association of persons or legal entities established de facto or de jure, even if temporarily, incorporated or not, which do not perform business activity, therefore not being possible to use the gross sales criteria, the fine will be set between fifty thousand reais (BRL 50,000.00) to two billion reais (BRL 2,000,000,000.00);

III - if the administrator is directly or indirectly responsible for the violation, when negligence or willful misconduct is proven, a fine of one percent (1%) to twenty percent (20%) of the one applied to the company, in the case set forth in Item I

10 The information and documents attached to the Term presented by the Proponent due to the signing of the TCC, as well as the opinions of the SG/CADE and of the Tribunal with regard to the request shall follow the rules of confidentiality provided for in Articles 50 et seq. of the RICADE. Information with more than 5 (five) years and inherently public information related to listed companies.

11 I.e., 0,1% in the case of legal entities, pursuant to sub-paragraph I, for example.
of the caput of this Article, or to legal entities, in the cases set forth in item II of
the caput of this article.

§ 1 In case of recurrence, the fines shall be doubled.

§ 2 In the calculation of the value of the fine referred to in item I of the caput of
this article, CADE may consider the total turnover of the company or group of
companies, when the value of sales in the field of business activity in which the
violation occurred is not available, as defined by CADE, or when it is incompletely
presented and/or not clearly and credibly demonstrated. (our highlights)

Thus, when negotiating the pecuniary contribution for the purposes of the TCC, the
SG/CADE follows the legal requirement that such contribution shall not be lower than
the minimum fine applicable to the TCC Proponent and, in the case of a company,
never below the advantage obtained, when this advantage can be estimated.

In general, CADE also takes into consideration the scenario of the expected fine
based on the principles of reasonableness, proportionality and equality, additionally
to the following criteria provided for in Article 45 of Law nº 12.529/11, in verbis:

Art. 45. In the application of the penalties set forth in this Law, the following
shall be taken into consideration:
I - the severity of the violation;
II - the good faith of the transgressor;
III - the advantage obtained or envisaged
by the violator;
IV - whether the violation was consummated or not;
V - the degree of injury or threatened injury to free competition, the national
economy, consumers, or third parties;
VI - the negative economic effects produced in the market;
VII - the financial standing of the transgressor; and
VIII – any recurrence.

In view of this legislation, which establishes the guidelines for the applying a
pecuniary contribution under the TCC, the next sections detail how CADE has been
acting to date, always admitting future improvements. The three steps adopted by
the SG/CADE have been the following: definition of the applicable law (Section II.1),
calculation of the pecuniary contribution (Section II.2) and payment method of the
pecuniary contribution (Sub-section II.3).
II.1 Definition of the applicable law

In TCC negotiations where conducts initiated before 2012 are being investigated, the law applicable to the case must be analyzed to determine not only the legal minimum, but also the convenience of the proposal of a TCC, since Law n° 12.529/2011 has altered the sanctions applicable to antitrust violations provided for in Law n° 8.884/94.

The matter of intertemporal conflict of laws was addressed by the Administrative Tribunal in the ruling of Administrative Proceeding n° 08012.009834/2006-57. According to the opinion dedicated to the subject, the most favorable law must be applied, *in verbis*:

This proposition - to admit the application of Law 12.529/11 when and only when it is more favorable to the Defendants in cases pending ruling - seems to be correct, as it recognizes a change in society's parameters of value in antitrust administrative law, without affecting the legal certainty of administrative *res judicata*. [...]

Finally, it is important to register that the application of the subsequent more beneficial law in antitrust cases pending ruling by CADE, is consistent with the principles of the 1988 Constitution, which determine that the alteration of the value standards of society with respect to a violating conduct should, when more beneficial to the citizen and when the corresponding case has not yet been ruled by the authority of competent jurisdiction, be reflected in the determination of the sanction. Additionally, such application is also connected, from an axiological point of view, to other fundamental principles for exercise of the punitive right of the State, such as proportionality, individualization of the sanction and the extent to which the practice is reproachable.

Based on this assumption, the Administrative Tribunal verified that the most favorable law depends on the quality of the Defendant, since the changes of Law n° 12.529/2011 were not more beneficial to all categories of antitrust violators. Based on these considerations, it is possible to extract the following rule:

(i) Company: application of Law n° 12.529/2011, since it is more beneficial than the previous law;

(ii) Administrator: application of Law n° 12.529/2011, since it is more beneficial than the previous law;

(iii) Other individuals (non-administrator) or legal entities, associations of entities or non-business de facto or de jure entities: application of Law n° 8.884/1994, since it is more beneficial than the subsequent law.

However, it is important to mention that this standard for defining which law would be more beneficial is understood as mere *assumption*, susceptible to proof that this
interpretation is not true in any individual case. It is also important to clarify that it is applied only for cases in which the violation had begun and had ended before Law 12.529/11 came into force, but the Administrative Proceeding is still ongoing.

II.2 Calculation of the pecuniary contribution

The pecuniary contribution is based on the following requirements: the need for a sanction that is proportional to the conduct; the need for a fine that can dissuade administrators and third parties; and the need to provide legal certainty and equality among Defendants.

In order to quantify the pecuniary contribution, the expected fine for the company must be calculated (Article 187 of the RICADE), and it must not be lower than the advantage obtained from participating in a cartel, when such advantage can be estimated (Article 37, sub-paragraph I, of Law nº 12.529/2011). Whenever possible, the advantage obtained must be calculated.

It is important to note that, in order to attract companies to adhere to this kind of agreements, the amount of the contribution should be lower than the fine, but not necessarily lower than the advantage obtained.

With respect to the expected fine, there are some differences regarding companies (Sub-section II.2.1) and individuals (Sub-section II.2.2) – including administrators and non-administrators.

II.2.1 Calculation of the pecuniary contribution for companies

The calculation of the expected fine for companies corresponds to the financial amount derived from the hypothetical application, to the case under analysis, of the provision of Article 37 of Law 12.529/2011, in verbis:

Art. 37. A violation of the economic order subjects the ones responsible to the following penalties:

(...)

I - in the case of a company, a fine of one tenth percent (0.1%) to twenty percent (20%) of the gross sales of the company, group or conglomerate, in the last fiscal year before the establishment of the administrative proceeding, in the field of the business activity in which the violation occurred, which will never be lower than the advantage obtained, when the estimation thereof is possible;

Thus, CADE clarifies that, as a rule, the systematic calculation of the expected fine is the following: definition of the calculation basis/turnover (II.2.1.1), update of the calculation basis/turnover (II.2.1.2), application of the percentage of the calculation
CADE states that, further to the provisions of Article 37, sub-paragraph I, of Law 12.529/2011, transcribed above, it must use the gross turnover (including taxes) of the Proponent’s economic group obtained in the field of the business activity in which the practice occurred in the year prior to the initiation of the Administrative Proceeding. For the application of this rule, the list “field of business activities” discriminated in CADE Resolution nº 3, of May 29th 2012 should be consulted (“Resolution nº 3/2012”).

Taking into consideration the rule of joint liability provided for in Article 33 of Law nº 12.529/2011, and in order for the protection granted by the TCC to be extended to all the economic group of the Proponent, it is necessary that the calculation basis takes into account the turnover of the group as a whole in the field in question.

As expressly provided for in Article 37, §2 of Law 12.529/2011, when the value of the turnover in the field of business activity in which the violation occurred is not available, as determined by CADE, or when it is incompletely presented or not clearly and credibly demonstrated, CADE may take into consideration the total turnover of the company or group of companies. Additionally, if the criterion of gross turnover cannot be used, the fine shall be set between BRL 50,000.00 (fifty thousand reais) and BRL 2,000,000,000.00 (two billion reais).

In this sense, to deal with and solve issues of proportionality and reasonableness presented in the case at hand, CADE’s experience consisted in taking into consideration some aspects to better aim at a value of calculation basis more related to the violation itself, such as:

(i) Turnover of the product or service affected by the cartel, which is not necessarily the definition of relevant market\(^\text{12}\) (eg. cartel involving a

\(^{12}\) Cases of Air Cargo (Req. nº 08700.010220/2012-16), Meters (Req. nº 08700.009323/2014-97), Cables (Req. nº 08700.002074/2013-28), and Clutches (Req. nº 08700.001445/2015-16), for example.
very specific product or service in a very broad field of business activities); (ii) Turnover related to the geographic scope of the conduct, which is not necessarily the relevant market (e.g.: state, municipal or local cartel practiced by a company with nationwide operations and turnover in the field of business activity); (iii) Turnover obtained with the revenue effectively maintained by the company with the business in question\(^{13}\) (e.g.: cases in which the company’s turnover includes the totality of a good/service, but only part of this value is effectively retained by it as, for example, commission, with the rest being passed on to another agent).

II.2.1.2.2 Parameterization regarding the base year of the turnover Depending on the procedural timing in which the negotiation occurs and also on the determination of absence of proportionality between the Proponent’s turnover in the year prior to the initiation of the Administrative Proceeding and its turnover in the years in which the conduct took place, CADE may take into consideration some aspects to adjust the agreement.

CADE lists below some aspects that can be taken into consideration to determine proportionality and reasonableness:

In cases where the negotiation occurs in an Administrative Proceeding that has not been initiated (e.g., Administrative Inquiry or Preliminary Proceedings), CADE may take into consideration the fiscal year prior to the initiation of the Administrative Inquiry or Preliminary Proceeding, or even, in they are confidential, CADE may take into consideration the turnover of the year prior to the year of presentation of the TCC;

In cases where there is clear lack of proportionality between the turnover in the year prior to the initiation of AP/AI and the turnover obtained in the period of the conduct (for example, the termination of the activities of the company in the cartelized market or considerable growth/reduction of the market), it is possible to take into consideration:

(i) Application of the turnover for the last 12 months of the conduct;\(^{14}\)
(ii) Application of the highest annual turnover obtained during the conduct;\(^{15}\)
(iii) Average of the turnovers during the period of the conduct.

\(^{13}\) Case of Air Freight (Reqs. n° 08700.010662 2012-54, 08700.010314.2013-68, 08700.011226.2013-83 and 08700.001455/2015-51), for example.
\(^{14}\) Cases of TFT-LCD (Req n°. 08700.003192/2013-53, n° 08700.007696/2013-42) and of CPT/CDT (Req n° 08700.011328/2013-07 and 08700.011327/2013-54), for example.
\(^{15}\) Case of DRAM (Req. n° 08700.003191/2013-09 and n° 08700.001718/2011-07), for example.
II.2.1.2.3 Parameterization with respect to the turnover at the national level

In cases where the TCC Proponent does not have a turnover in Brazil (e.g., international cartels in which the Proponent did not obtain revenue in the Brazilian market under investigation) CADE takes into consideration the following aspects for the purpose of proportionality and reasonableness:

(i) “Virtual turnover” in the Brazilian market, i.e., the application of the Proponent’s worldwide market share on the total volume of the national market; 16

(ii) Other factors, such as estimates of indirect sales of the Proponent in the national market in cases of international cartel or in cases of companies without turnover in Brazil. In other words, the estimate of sales in Brazil of byproducts that used the cartelized product as an input.

II.2.1.2 Update of the calculation basis

Upon completion of the first step related to the calculation of the expected fine – definition of the calculation base/turnover (II.2.1.1) – it is time to proceed to the monetary update of such value, which is done by applying the SELIC rate 17, since, additionally to inflation, the opportunity cost of the non-profitable money must be taken into consideration (which is, at least, the return on investment in public bonds, expressed by the nominal interest, which includes the real interest).

In turn, the period of update corresponds to the range of months between the turnover used (in the year prior to the initiation of the Administrative Proceeding or, for example, the last 12 months of the conduct; see II.2.1.1) and the month prior to the filing of a TCC request.

Therefore, the SELIC rate is used to update the company’s turnover to current values. There are two manners to calculate the update of the calculation

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17 The SELIC rate is calculated by the Central Bank of Brazil, which is its primary source. Nowadays, there are two SELIC calculators: the Central Bank of Brazil and the Brazilian Revenue Office. Whereas the Central Bank of Brazil takes into consideration compound interest, the Brazilian Revenue Office takes simple interest into account. According to Law 9021/95, the turnover update for the purpose of CADE fines is calculated in the same way as the calculation of federal taxes which, nowadays, is the SELIC rate. However, according to the jurisprudence of the courts related to taxes, such federal tax updates must not result in compound interest. The Federal Revenue Office has therefore developed a calculator: http://idg.receita.fazenda.gov.br/orientacao/tributaria/pagamentos-e-parcelamentos/taxa-de-juros-selic. As the law determines the same calculation used to update federal taxes, CADE normally uses the calculator of the Brazilian Federal Revenue Office for TCCs.
base/turnover, achieving the same result: the first alternative is to add the monthly rates of the update period; the second alternative consists in subtracting the accumulated rates of the first and of the last month of the updated period. According to the first method, the initial date for the update will be the first month of the fiscal year subsequent to the one of the turnover used and the last date will be the month prior to the filing of TCC request. In the second method, the initial date will be the last month of the turnover year used and the last date will be the month prior to the month of filing of TCC request.

II.2.1.3 Percentage of the expected fine

Upon completion of the first two steps of calculation of the expected fine – definition of calculation basis (II.2.1.1) and its update (II.2.1.2) – the following sections present the criteria used by CADE for the definition of the expected fine percentage, i.e., the percentage of the calculation base that results in the expected fine. The criteria below are mere parameters, which may be altered at CADE’s discretion in exceptional circumstances.

As a rule, in classic cartel cases (or “hard core” cartels), the initial reference adopted by CADE in TCC negotiations is the application of a 15% amount on the calculation base considered, in line with the latest convictions of the Administrative Tribunal for this type of conduct.

However, depending on mitigating or aggravating circumstances, additionally to other factors that take into account the principles of reasonableness, proportionality and equality, and the criteria provided for in Article 45 of Law nº 12.529/2011, this percentage may be reduced to the minimum considered by CADE as adequate to discourage this kind of conduct, usually 12%, or increased to the maximum permitted by law, 20%.18

The table below lists some illustrative hypotheses of mitigating circumstances in cases of classic cartels that can reduce the percentage to the minimum level considered by CADE for such cases (12%, as a rule):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Severity of the violation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The violator has been coerced to participate in the conduct;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Case of industrial constructions onshore of Petrobras (Req nº. 08700.007402/2015-44).
The violator had peripheral/occasional participation in the conduct;

The conduct had extremely short duration (up to six months), as long as this circumstance does not result from the actions of public authorities to interrupt the conduct;

**Good faith of the violator**

Previous suggestion of adoption of the conduct by a public entity (eg., terms of commitment with Public Prosecutors or other public bodies, court decisions, decisions of regulatory agencies, bylaws, etc.);

Existence of compliance programs that relate directly to the decision to propose a TCC and/or resulting from cooperation presented within the scope of the TCC;

**Financial standing of the violator**

The SG/CADE also lists some illustrative hypotheses of *aggravating* circumstances in classic cartel cases that may increase the percentage rate up to the legal maximum (20%):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Severity of the violation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership without coercion of other defendants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership with coercion of other defendants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of the conduct and of the participation (1 to 5 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High duration of the conduct and of the participation (5 to 10 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely high duration of the conduct and of the participation (over 10 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Absence of good faith of the violator</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous suggestion of interruption of the conduct on the part of a public entity (eg., terms of commitment with Public Prosecutor’s Offices or other bodies, court decisions, decisions of regulatory agencies, etc.) and continuity of the conduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Degree of harm, or potential harm, to competition, to the national economy, to consumers or to third parties:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essentiality of the product on which the cartel was based;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Direct negative impact on strategic public policies for the country

**Negative economic effects produced in the market**

High negative economic impacts

Other mitigating and aggravating circumstances verified in individual cases may also result, at CADE’s discretion, in variation of the percentage.

Moreover, as a rule, in the case of one-off or diffuse cartels (e.g., occasional or not systematic exchange of information, unilateral disclosure of information, etc.), CADE usually applies a rate of 5% to 12%, depending on certain mitigating or aggravating circumstances and additionally to other factors that take into consideration the principles of reasonableness, proportionality and equality and on the criteria provided for in Article 45 of Law nº 12.529/11. Specific circumstances of individual cases, however, may require the application of the percentage rate on a differentiated basis.

Lastly, taking into consideration Article 37, § 1, of Law nº 12.529/11, in the event of **recidivism** the percentage applied to the calculation base shall be doubled when the Party has already been convicted.

**II.2.1.4 Discount**

Upon completion of the first three steps for the calculation of the expected fine – definition of the calculation base/turnover (II.2.1.1), update of the calculation base/turnover (II.2.1.2) and application of the percentage rate (II.2.1.3) – the next and last step for the calculation of the pecuniary contribution of TCC is the application of the discount.

With respect to the calculation of the discount in cases of TCC filed at the SG/CADE, since the TCC is directly related to the Proponent’s cooperation, reference is made to Part I (specifically, Section I.3) of these Guidelines.

At this point, it must be reiterated that the minimum and maximum discount percentages in TCCs are provided for in Article 187 of RICADE, which takes into consideration the following bands, graded according to the time of the filing of the agreement:

(i) **First proponent before the SG/CADE:** 30% to 50% discount on the expected fine;

(ii) **Second proponent before the SG/CADE:** 25% to 40% of the expected fine;
(iii) Third and other proponents before the SG/CADE: up to 25% of the expected fine.

In the case of TCCs filed before the Tribunal, according to Article 188 of RICADE, the maximum discount possible is 15%. It must be noted that filing a TCC after the opinions of CADE Attorney General’s Office and of the Federal Public Prosecutors Office have been presented significantly reduces the convenience and opportunity to sign the agreement filed at the Tribunal, all of which will be assessed according to the circumstances of the case at hand.

It is also important to note that, under Article 189 of the same law, no TCC proposal will provide for a percentage reduction above the one determined in TCCs already signed in the same case. This rule also applies to TCCs filed before the SG/CADE and the Administrative Tribunal, so that if a TCC negotiated before the SG/CADE determined a discount below 15%, the discount applied by the SG/CADE will be the maximum possible discount for TCCs at CADE’s Tribunal.

II.2.1.4.1 Combination of TCC and Leniency Plus discounts

There is also the possibility of combining TCC and Leniency Plus discounts. If the signatory of a new Leniency Agreement in a second cartel decides to sign a TCC related to a cartel that is already under investigation and where Leniency Agreements are not available, the benefits of the Leniency Plus and of the TCC may be combined, at CADE’s discretion.

Both discounts are applied subsequently (i.e., first the Leniency Plus and then the TCC discount) and non-cumulatively (i.e., the sum of both discounts). Cumulative application could result in excessive benefit for the company and/or individual that practiced cartel in several markets, with possible reduction of the dissuasive effect of the conduct, which could also discourage the presentation of new Leniency proposals, since TCCs would entail greater benefits.

The subsequent application of discounts (i.e., first the Leniency Plus Agreement and then the TCC discount) is based on interpretation of the laws, since Leniency Plus discounts fall upon the applicable penalty in general terms, whereas the TCC discount falls upon the expected fine, in the concrete case. Moreover, it maintains the consistency between the maximum discounts in Leniency Plus Agreement and

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19 Leniency Plus consists in the reduction of one third of the sanction applicable to the company and/or individual that does not qualify for a Leniency Agreement for a cartel, but that supplies information about another cartel not previously known by the SG/CADE (pursuant to Article 209 of RICADE combined with Article 86, §7, of Law n° 12.529/2011).
TCC, *vis-à-vis* the hypothesis of partial Leniency. Furthermore, the subsequent application of the additional discount pursuant to the Leniency Plus Agreement is not significantly different from CADE’s experience in TCC negotiations, but adequately benefits Proponents that cooperate in both investigations.

Given that a TCC negotiation considers discount bands, the subsequent application of Leniency Plus Agreements with TCC at SG/CADE, can result in the following total discount bands on the expected fine:

(i) In the case of first TCC proponent: from 53.33% to 66.67%;
(ii) In the case of second TCC proponent: from 50% to 60%;
(iii) For the other TCC proponents: up to 50%.

For further information regarding the signing of Leniency Agreements, see Articles 86 *et seq.* of Law nº 12.529/2011, Articles 96 *et seq.* of RICADE, as well as the Leniency Guidelines and FAQs.

**II.2.2 Calculation of the pecuniary contribution for individuals**

Individuals participating in anticompetitive conducts are analyzed differently in TCC negotiations, depending on whether they are administrators (*II.2.2.1*), non-administrators (*II.2.2.2*), or depending on the so-called “Accession Clause” (*II.2.2.3*) and “Umbrella Clause” (*II.2.2.4*).

**II.2.2.1 Company administrators**

Under Article 37, sub-paragraph III of Law nº 12.529/11, in the case of an administrator directly or indirectly responsible for the violation, upon evidence of intention (e.g. malice) or fault (e.g., negligence, imprudence or malpractice), the expected fine goes from 1% (one per cent) to 20% (twenty per cent) of the fine imposed on the company, legal entity or related entity (labor unions and associations, for instance).

In order to encourage individuals involved in cartel investigations to apply for a TCC at the beginning of the procedural instruction, especially in cases where there is difficulty in locating and in serving the individuals involved in the conduct, CADE considers reasonable that the pecuniary contributions should be closer to the legal minimum, i.e., around 1% of the contributions imposed on the company. However, this does not mean that higher penalties will not be applied depending on

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20 Partial Leniency, pursuant to Article 86, § 4, sub-paragraph II, of Law nº 12.529/2011, is the Leniency modality implemented when the SG/CADE has prior knowledge of the notified violation.
aggravating circumstances, or when the 1% criterion is below BRL 50,000.00 (fifty thousand reais).

It is worth noting that, as a rule, administrators are the individuals with the positions described in the bylaws or articles of association of the company. However, when the individual is not an administrator thereunder but has equivalent management powers or relevant participation in the cartel, his/her contribution is calculated in values that are similar to the administrator’s, subject to the maximum and minimum limits of contribution of non-administrators, addressed below. Examples of individuals that could have their contribution calculated in this manner are the directors, managers, superintendents, commercial supervisors, and others, with relevant participation in the cartel.

II.2.2.2 Other individuals (non-administrators)

Under Article 37, sub-paragraph II of Law 12.529/11, in the case of other individuals (i.e., non-administrators), the expected fine under the new law goes from BRL 50,000.00 (fifty thousand reais) to BRL 2,000,000,000.00 (two billion reais).

In order to encourage individuals involved in cartel investigations to come forward for signing of a TCC at the beginning of the proceedings, especially in cases where there is difficulty in locating and in serving the individuals involved in the conduct, CADE considers reasonable that the pecuniary contributions should be closer to the legal minimum. However, it is important to analyze the degree of participation of the individual in the investigated conduct, especially when it is someone who is not an administrator under the terms mentioned above, but who had equivalent management powers or relevant participation in the cartel, in which case the contribution is calculated in values that are similar to the administrator’s.

Lastly, even for cases of violation that has occurred when Law nº 8.884/1994 was in force, CADE does not consider reasonable to negotiate a TCC for a value that is below BRL 50,000.00 (fifty thousand reais).

II.2.2.3 Individuals under the ”Accession Clause”

Although, as a rule, individuals interested in signing a TCC should negotiate and sign the agreement directly as Proponent-Signatories, in some circumstances it is possible that they be subsequently included in a TCC negotiated and signed by the company where they worked at the time of the unlawful conduct. This usually happens when the company appears before the authority to negotiate the agreement without having, until that date, located and/or gathered all the employees involved in the
conduct, especially those that no longer are employees, i.e., who are working for other companies or who have retired.

In these cases, in order to speed up the negotiation process, the company can negotiate and sign its TCC individually, but already providing for in the agreement the conditions for subsequent inclusion of employees or former employees involved in the conduct. These conditions shall be provided for in the agreement under the so-called “accession clause”.

CADE’s main objective in signing agreements containing accession clauses is to reduce procedural costs of future individual negotiations. Additionally, in case of difficulty to serve defendants to the process, such as in international cartels cases, the accession clause has proved advantageous as it also reduces procedural costs of locating and notifying Defendants.

It is important to note that the accession clause does not prevent negotiation with individuals that are candidates to accession if they disagree with the terms of the negotiation. However, in this case, individuals will be entitled to the discount band in which they fit when their individual request is filed, and no longer to the discount band of the company.

As a rule, when calculating the value of accession of individuals, CADE has adopted the following provisions related to timing:

- up to six months after approval of the Term, a determined value;
- thereafter, addition of 50% on the aforementioned value.

The accession clause is agreed for determined time span, which is (i) 1 (one) year from the date of publication of the approval of the TCC in the Official Federal Gazette; or (ii) up to 60 (sixty) days from the date of publication of the Administrative Proceeding against the Employee in the Official Federal Gazette; whichever occurs first.

Finally, the pre-payment for the inclusion of individuals through the accession clause is available to the Proponent, although there is no reimbursement in the event of termination of the accession.

II.2.2.4 Individuals under the “Umbrella Clause”

In addition to the possibility of including individuals in TCCs negotiated and signed by a company under the “accession clause”, in some circumstances employees involved in the conduct can be included in a TCC under the so-called “Umbrella Clause”.
This clause can be used when the company wishes to terminate all its relation to the case, including the possibility of finding an employee involved in the conduct, but not yet identified (by the company or by the Public Administration) until the time of signing of the TCC. It is therefore used when the probability of identifying new participants in the conduct is low.

CADE’s main objective with the Umbrella Clause is also to reduce procedural costs.

The aim is to address the liability of all the individuals related to that company that is negotiating a TCC that may come to be identified as involved in the conduct, avoiding the need to include new Defendants or initiate new cases whenever the participation of an additional employee in the conduct is identified.

As a rule, for the calculation of employees’ pecuniary contributions under the Umbrella Clause, CADE considers the following parameter: an additional value corresponding to 10% of the pecuniary contribution owed by the company, and such percentage may be increased or reduced depending on the circumstances of each case.

Therefore, the main differences between the Umbrella Clause and the Accession Clause are the following:

(i) the Umbrella Clause extends to individuals not yet identified, whereas the Accession Clause extends to those who have already been clearly identified in the investigation;

(ii) in the Umbrella Clause, the company has already paid a flat amount, irrespective of how many other employees have been involved in the conduct and are subsequently identified, whereas in the Accession Clause the value is paid per individual only after the inclusion.

(iii) the Umbrella Clause makes the initiation of an Administrative Proceeding against new individuals related to the Party meaningless, whereas the Accession Clause

21 For individuals, this percentage corresponds to a minimum contribution of 10 additional administrators that have not been identified. It is a reasonable amount for the Public Administration, given that it extends to a considerable number of new categories of individuals. It is not reasonable to assume that, after the effort to compose the Defendants and/or analysis of Histories of Conduct and other TCCs, there would still be a large number of unidentified individuals.

22 E.g.: Roller bearing case (Req. n° 08700.001413/2015-11), in which the Umbrella Clause was established at 2%, since it did not seem reasonable to charge the value resulting from the application of 10%, given the high value of the final contribution of the legal entity and the number of individuals involved.

23 CADE’s General Superintendence explains that if the proceeding is initiated, it shall be immediately halted in relation to the individual or legal entity of the group of the Party that has signed a TCC containing an Accession Clause.
requires the initiation of an Administrative Proceeding against the identified individual and only after the inclusion is the accession possible.

(iv) the Umbrella Clause does not have a time span and remains in force indefinitely as long as the TCC is not declared breached, while the Accession Clause is agreed for a time frame, as previously mentioned.

II.3 Payment method of the pecuniary contribution

Upon determination of the final value of the pecuniary contribution, the payment method is then negotiated. CADE admits the possibility of extending payment deadlines and also the option of installment payments.

In the case of a single installment, the deadline is usually up to 90 (ninety) days, without monetary correction based on the SELIC rate. In exceptional cases, the payment in a single installment may be carried out in up to 180 (one hundred and eighty) days, without monetary correction based on the SELIC rate, depending on the value of the contribution and the circumstances of each case.

In the event of payment in installments, pursuant to Article 196 of RICADE, the installments shall be necessarily adjusted in accordance with the SELIC rate, in verbis:

Art. 196. Under the terms of a Cease and Desist Agreement (TCC) that contains a pecuniary contribution, CADE can accept payment thereof in installments.

Sole paragraph. The installments of the pecuniary contribution shall necessarily be corrected by the rate of the Special System of Settlement and Custody - SELIC, announced by the Central Bank of Brazil (BACEN).

As a rule, the installments may extend to up to 2 (two) years, and the SELIC rate is applied on the second installment and on all the others thereafter. In exceptional cases, installments extending to up to 4 (four) years may be authorized, depending on the circumstances of individual cases, with application of the SELIC rate on the second installment and on all the others thereafter. Longer periods is only admitted in absolutely exceptional and specific circumstances, and in no event shall extend for an excessive period.

CADE adopts the following parameters to define the installment period:

- amount of the pecuniary contribution;
- absolute amount of each installment;
- financial standing of the company duly demonstrated;
• reasonableness of payment in installments, so as not to mitigate the dissuasive character of the pecuniary contribution;
• scaling of the payment value and possibility of advanced payment of installments.

Finally, CADE does not deem appropriate to have short payment deadlines (e.g., monthly installments), since the cost of monitoring the payment of each installment is high.

III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATED CONDUCT, COMMITMENT NOT TO NOT PRACTICE IT AGAIN AND OTHER MEASURES

Acknowledgement of participation in the investigated conduct is a requirement of RICADE to sign TCCs in cartel cases, pursuant to Article 185, in verbis:

Art. 185. In investigations of agreement, combination, manipulation or arrangement among competitors, the Cease and Desist Agreement shall necessarily contain the acknowledgement of participation in the investigated conduct by the party thereto.

CADE points out that this requirement has already been confirmed by Brazilian courts24, so that there is no possibility of signing of a TCC in cartel cases without the acknowledgement of participation in the investigated conduct, which must be included in the agreement.

With respect to the commitment to not practice the investigated conduct again, it is based on Article 85, § 1, sub-paragraph I, of Law12.529/2011, which determines that the term shall additionally include:

Art. 85. In the administrative proceedings referenced to in sub-paragraphs I, II and III of Art. 48 of this Law, CADE may obtain from the defendant a Cease and Desist Agreement related to the practice under investigation or its harmful effects, if duly grounded, for convenience and at the proper time, and if it understands that it complies with the interests protected by law.

§ 1 The agreement shall contain the following elements:

I - specification of the defendant’s obligations not to practice the investigated activity or its harmful effects, as well as obligations deemed applicable;

II – the setting of fines to be paid in case of failure to comply, in full or in part, with the undertaken obligations;

24 About the requirement to acknowledge participation in the conduct, the Federal Regional Tribunal of the 1st Region has already ruled that “the rule contained in RICADE did not exceed the limits provided for in the applicable laws, but merely regulated, based on objective criteria, in which situations it would be possible to execute Cease and Desist Agreements, and in this case is a an essential condition that the party thereto acknowledge participation in the conduct.” Interlocutory Appeal 0070598-57.2013.4.01.0000/DF (30.01.2014) and Interlocutory Appeal 0004708-40.2014.4.01.0000 (03.02.2014), Federal Justice Rapporteur Jirair Aram Meguerian.
III - the setting of pecuniary contributions to be paid to the Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Rights, when applicable.

To make sure that the Proponent will not practice the investigated conduct again, CADE can demand commitment to adopt preventive measures. These measures can be included in the term generically or in a detailed manner, depending on the circumstances of each case.

Lastly, the Proponent may be requested to adopt structural and/or behavioral measures to stimulate and/or re-establish competition in the market, or even to repair the negative effects of the conduct.

IV. TEMPLATES

CADE provides different TCC templates. As a rule, the text and format of the term are standard and must be preserved in accordance with the templates released by CADE, or altered as little as possible, so as to speed up the negotiations and maintain the equality of all agreements. Alteration requests made by a Proponent should be exceptional and duly grounded in view of specific concrete circumstances. CADE also reserves the right to make alterations when specific circumstances so require.

V. ATTACHMENTS

V.1 Template of Cease and Desist Agreement

CEASE AND DESIST AGREEMENT

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica - “CADE”), in this act represented by its President, [NAME OF THE PRESIDENT OF CADE], pursuant to Article 10, item VII, of Law No. 12529, of 30 November 2011, in compliance with the Tribunal decision rendered in the [NUMBER OF SESSION] Ordinary Judgment Session held on [DATE OF SESSION]; and [NAME OF THE COMPANY OR INDIVIDUAL], duly qualified in the Administrative Proceeding No. [NUMBER OF THE PROCEEDING] and in this act represented by its attorneys [NAME OF ATTORNEY], each party referred as “Committing Party” and collectively as “Committing Parties”), decide to enter into this Cease and Desist Commitment (“Agreement”), under the following terms and conditions, all in accordance with the provisions set out in article 85 of Law No. 12529/11 (and former article 53 of Law No. 8,884/94) and CADE’s Internal Rules.

Clause 1 – Subject Matter and Scope
1.1. This Agreement’s purpose is to preserve and protect the competitive conditions in the markets for [], as well as to stay and, if all the obligations set out herein are fully complied with, close Administrative Proceeding No. [] in relation to the Committing Parties.

Clause 2 – Acknowledgement of Participation in the Practice

2.1 In accordance with the requirements set forth by the applicable legislation, the execution of this Agreement entails admission, by the Committing Parties of the fact described in the “History of Conduct”, which is part of this Agreement as Attachment I, and that is also composed of the documents presented by the Committing Parties.

2.2 Attachment I will be treated as a document of restricted access to all CADE’s bodies and will be attached in a separate case records accessible only to the other Defendants in the Administrative Proceedings No. [] or in any other Administrative Proceedings that may be initiated by CADE to investigate the same facts, and it will serve as evidence, in accordance with the same confidentiality rules from the Leniency Agreement, to the extent applicable, under the terms of the specific rules with respect to the Cease and Desist Agreement and other rules herein established. The document will be made available to the other Defendants strictly for the purpose of exercising the right to the contradictory and full defence in the aforementioned Administrative Proceeding, being prohibit its disclosure to or sharing with other natural or legal persons, total or partially, in Brazil or in other jurisdictions; the failure to comply with the confidentiality obligation will entail administrative, civil and criminal liability to the offenders.

2.3 The Committing Parties and CADE acknowledge that the obligations and effects of the present Cease and Desist Agreement are limited to the Brazilian market and to the national territory, and do not have any relation with the foreign jurisdictions or territories.

Clause 3 – Obligations of the Committing Parties

3.1. Pecuniary Contribution. – The Committing Parties undertake to make the payment of pecuniary contributions as set out below:

3.1.1. As Legal Entity, the Committing Party [] undertakes to make a pecuniary contribution to the Diffuse Rights Fund (“Fundo de Direitos Difusos” in Portuguese) in the total amount of R$ [], to be paid in a single installment, due [ ] days, counted from the publication in the Official Gazette of the decision that approved this Settlement by CADE’s Tribunal.

3.1.2 As Individual, the Committing Party [] undertakes to make a pecuniary contribution to the Diffuse Rights Fund in the total amount of R$ [], to be paid in a
single installment, due [__] days, counted from the publication in the Official Gazette of the decision that approved this Settlement by CADE’s Tribunal.

3.1.3 To confirm the payment of the aforementioned pecuniary contributions, the Committing Parties undertake to provide to CADE an authenticated copy of the proof of payment within 15 (fifteen) days after payment.

3.2. Cooperation – The Committing Parties undertake to:

3.2.1. Provide CADE with documents, information and other material which the Committing Parties have or may come to have possession, custody, control or knowledge, and that are related to the facts under investigation in Administrative Proceeding No. [__], submitting, at their own expenses, whenever requested by CADE, sworn translations of the documents provided;

3.2.2 Cooperate fully and permanently with CADE in every aspect of the investigation of Administrative Proceeding No. [__];

3.2.3. Whenever requested by CADE, attend to, at their own expenses, every procedural act, until the final judgment of Administrative Proceeding No. [__];

3.2.4. Notify CADE of any and all substantial modification in the information contained in this Agreement.

3.2.5 Assist CADE in the initial notification of Employees against whom an Administrative Proceeding is eventually initiated if so requested in writing by CADE;

3.2.6 Provide, whenever requested, the translation of the documents provided by them under this Agreement from Portuguese to [LANGUAGE] and from [LANGUAGE] to Portuguese, if necessary for the purposes of the discovery phase of the Administrative Proceeding No. [__], in relation to the conduct perpetrated.

3.3 Future conduct – The Committing Parties undertake to:

3.3.1 In an irreversible and irrevocable manner, refrain from practicing any of the conducts investigated in the case records of Administrative Proceeding No. [__], as well as to adopt measures to assure that these conducts will not occur again;

3.3.2. Behave with honesty, loyalty and good faith during the fulfillment of these obligations;

3.3.3 Refrain from performing any act and not omitting itself in any way that may jeopardize to the regular progress of the investigations undertaken by CADE. As a consequence, (the Committing Parties also agree to) behave in a manner consistent to the obligations and expressions of will provided for in this Agreement.
Clause 4 – Stay and Closing of the Administrative Proceeding

4.1. The Administrative Proceedings No. [___] will be stayed in relation to the Committing Parties until the final judgment of this Administrative Proceeding by the Administrative Tribunal of Economic Defense, when compliance with the obligations set forth in this Agreement will be assessed, or until the assessment by CADE of noncompliance with the Agreement, pursuant to Clause 5, whichever comes first.

4.2. Simultaneously to the conclusion of the investigation regarding the facts investigated in Administrative Proceeding No. [___], pursuant to Article 74 of Law No. 12529/11, CADE’s General Superintendence will render a detailed report regarding compliance with the obligations of this Agreement by the Committing Parties, containing a full description of the behavior of the Committing Parties throughout the investigation.

4.3. Once assessed full compliance with all obligations contained in Clause 3, Administrative Proceeding No. [___] will be closed in relation to the Committing Parties, pursuant to the Article 85, paragraph 9 of Law No. 12529/2011.

Clause 5 - Non-compliance with the Agreement

5.1. Any eventual non-compliance with this Agreement by the Committing Parties or by any Employee that may have joined the Agreement, under the terms of Clause 5, must necessarily be declared by CADE’s Tribunal, after a due investigative process, in the case records of Request No [___], in which the Committing Parties or the Employee that allegedly failed to comply will have the right to full defence to demonstrate compliance, including the possibility of presenting evidence.

5.2. Once assessed, by CADE’s Tribunal, the non-compliance with any of the obligations established in Clause 3 of this Agreement, Administrative Proceeding No. [___] will be resumed in relation to the Committing Party or the Employee that failed to comply, guaranteeing the right to defence in the course of the investigations, under the same conditions of the remaining defendants and under the terms of the law.

5.3. In the case of unjustified delay, without previous consent, in relation to the payment of the pecuniary contribution indicated in Clauses 3.1, or in relation to the filing of the proof of payment indicated in Clause 3.1.2, for less than thirty (30) days counting from the due date, the Committing Parties will be subject, exclusively, to a daily fine in the value of R$ 10,000 (ten thousand reais).

5.4. In the case of unjustified delay, without previous consent, in relation to the payment of the pecuniary contribution indicated in Clauses 5.4, or in relation to the filing of the proof of payment indicated in Clause 5.4.4, for less than thirty (30) days
counting from the due date, the Employee will be subject, exclusively, to a daily fine in the value of R$ 1,000 (one thousand reais).

5.5. The declaration of full non-compliance with this Agreement will result in a fine to [___] in default in the amount of R$ [__] and to other Committing Parties in the amount of [__].

Clause 6 – Enforcement

6.1. This Agreement is an out-of-court enforcement instrument, under the terms of Article 85, paragraph 8, of Law No. 12529/2011.

Clause 7 – Publication

7.1. The Settlement Agreement will be disclosed at the moment of its review by CADE’s Tribunal, and it will be made public after its approval, under the terms of article 85, paragraph 7, of Law No. 12,529/11, guaranteeing confidentiality of the terms of the negotiation.

Clause 8 – Notification

8.1 All notifications and other communications in relation to the Committing Parties shall be addressed to:

[___]
[OFFICE]
[ADDRESS]
[E-MAIL]
[TELEPHONE]
[FAX]

And because the Parties agree, they sign this Agreement in the electronic way, with 2 (two) witnesses designated below:

Brasília, [Date]

ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE

[NAME – PRESIDENT]
Committing Parties

Witnesses:

1. NAME:  
   ID:  

2. NAME:  
   ID:  

ATTACHMENT I

History of Conduct

(RESTRICTED ACCESS)

ATTACHMENT II

Details on the Parties’ Contributions

(RESTRICTED ACCESS)
CEASE AND DESIST AGREEMENT

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica - “CADE”), in this act represented by its President, [NAME OF THE PRESIDENT OF CADE], pursuant to Article 10, item VII, of Law No. 12529, of 30 November 2011, in compliance with the Tribunal decision rendered in the [NUMBER OF SESSION] Ordinary Judgment Session held [DATE OF SESSION]; and [NAME OF THE DEFENDANTS], duly qualified in the Administrative Proceeding No. [_] and in this act represented by [NAME OF ATTORNEY] (each party referred as “Committing Party” and collectively as “Committing Parties”), decide to enter into this Cease and Desist Commitment (“Agreement”), under the following terms and conditions, all in accordance with the provisions set out in article 85 of Law No. 12529/11 (and former article 53 of Law No. 8,884/94) and CADE’s Internal Rules.

Clause 1 – Subject Matter and Scope

1.1. This Agreement’s purpose is to preserve and protect the competitive conditions in the markets for [__], as well as to stay and, if all the obligations set out herein are fully complied with, close Administrative Proceeding No. [_] in relation to the Committing Parties.

Clause 2 – Acknowledgement of Participation in the Practice

2.1 In accordance with the requirements set forth by the applicable legislation, the execution of this Agreement entails admission, by the Committing Parties of the facts described in the “History of Conduct”, which is part of this Agreement as Attachment I, and that is also composed of the documents presented by the Committing Parties.

2.2 Attachment I will be treated as a document of restricted access to all CADE’s bodies and will be attached in a separate case records accessible only to the other Defendants in the Administrative Proceedings No. [_] or in any other Administrative Proceedings that may be initiated by CADE to investigate the same facts, and it will serve as evidence, in accordance with the same confidentiality rules from the Leniency Agreement, to the extent applicable, under the terms of the specific rules with respect to the Cease and Desist Agreement and other rules herein established. The document will be made available to the other Defendants strictly for the purpose of exercising the right to the contradictory and full defence in the aforementioned Administrative Proceeding, being prohibit its disclosure to or sharing with other natural or legal persons, total or partially, in Brazil or in other jurisdictions; the failure
to comply with the confidentiality obligation will entail administrative, civil and
criminal liability to the offenders.

2.3 The Committing Parties and CADE acknowledge that the obligations and effects
of the present Cease and Desist Agreement are limited to the Brazilian market and to
the national territory, and do not have any relation with the foreign jurisdictions or
territories.

Clause 3 – Obligations of the Committing Parties

3.1. Pecuniary Contribution. – The Committing Parties undertake to make the
payment of pecuniary contributions as set out below:

3.1.1. As Committing Party [...] undertakes to make a pecuniary contribution to the
Fund for Protection of Social Rights (“FDDD”) in the total amount of R$ [...], to be
paid in a single installment, due [...] days, counted from the publication in the Official
Gazette of the decision that approved this Settlement by CADE’s Tribunal.

Each of the Committing Parties [...] undertakes to make a pecuniary contribution to
the Fund for Protection of Social Rights (“FDDD”) in the amount of R$ [...] for each
Committing Party, to be paid in a single installment, due [...] days, counted from the
publication in the Official Gazette of the decision that approved this Settlement by
CADE’s Tribunal.

Each of the Committing Parties [...] undertakes to make a pecuniary contribution to
the Fund for Protection of Social Rights (“FDDD”) in the amount of R$ [...] for each
Committing Party, to be paid in a single installment, due [...] days, counted from the
publication in the Official Gazette of the decision that approved this Settlement by
CADE’s Tribunal.

3.1.4. To confirm the payment of the aforementioned pecuniary contributions, the
Committing Parties undertake to provide to CADE an authenticated copy of the proof
of payment within 15 (fifteen) days after payment.

3.2. Cooperation – The Committing Parties undertake to:

3.2.1. Provide CADE with documents, information and other material which the
Committing Parties have or may come to have possession, custody, control or
knowledge, and that are related to the facts under investigation in Administrative
Proceeding No. [...], submitting, at their own expenses, whenever requested by
CADE, sworn translations of the documents provided;

3.2.2 Cooperate fully and permanently with CADE in every aspect of the investigation
of Administrative Proceeding No. [...];
3.2.3. Whenever requested by CADE, attend to, at their own expenses, every procedural act, until the final judgment of Administrative Proceeding No. [__];

3.2.4. Notify CADE of any and all substantial modification in the information contained in this Agreement.

3.2.5 Assist CADE in the initial notification of Employees against whom an Administrative Proceeding is eventually initiated if so requested in writing by CADE;

3.2.6 Provide, whenever requested, the translation of the documents provided by them under this Agreement from Portuguese to English and from English to Portuguese, if necessary for the purposes of the discovery phase of the Administrative Proceeding No. [__], in relation to the conduct perpetrated.

3.3 Future conduct – The Committing Parties undertake to:

3.3.1 In an irreversible and irrevocable manner, refrain from practicing any of the conduct investigated in the case records of Administrative Proceeding No. [__], as well as to adopt measures to assure that these conducts will not occur again;

3.3.2. Behave with honesty, loyalty and good faith during the fulfillment of these obligations;

3.3.3 Refrain from performing any act and not omitting itself in any way that may jeopardize to the regular progress of the investigations undertaken by CADE. As a consequence, (the Committing Parties also agree to) behave in a manner consistent to the obligations and expressions of will provided for in this Agreement.

Clause 4 – Stay and Closing of the Administrative Proceeding

4.1. The Administrative Proceedings No. [__] will be stayed in relation to the Committing Parties until the final judgment of this Administrative Proceeding by the Administrative Tribunal of Economic Defense, when compliance with the obligations set forth in this Agreement will be assessed, or until the assessment by CADE of noncompliance with the Agreement, pursuant to Clause 6, whichever comes first.

4.2. Simultaneously to the conclusion of the investigation regarding the facts investigated in Administrative Proceeding No. [__], pursuant to Article 74 of Law No. 12529/11, CADE’s General Superintendence will render a detailed report regarding compliance with the obligations of this Agreement by the Committing Parties, containing a full description of the behavior of the Committing Parties throughout the investigation.

4.3. Once assessed full compliance with all obligations contained in Clause 3, Administrative Proceeding No. [__] will be closed in relation to the Committing Parties, pursuant to the Article 85, paragraph 9 of Law No. 12529/2011.
Clause 5 - Adhesion by Individuals

5.1 Individuals that, at the time of the investigated facts, worked for the Committing Parties, or for any company of its economic group, may join this Agreement, provided that the following conditions are met:

5.1.1 The individual who falls within the concept contained in Clause 5.1 ("Employee") shall file a submission indicating his interest in joining this Agreement, and, consequently, take up all obligations that are applicable to such Employee.

5.1.2 The interested individual shall file the document indicated in Exhibit III of this Agreement, duly filled out, in the records of the Request No [

5.1.3 No exception concerning the terms and conditions set out in this Agreement can be made by the Employee who intends to adhere to it;

5.1.4 CADE’s General-Superintendence, after verifying the correct filling of Attachment III, especially the correct compliance of the Employee with Clause 5.4, and that no exception pursuant to Clause 5.1.3 was made, will recommend the granting of the adhesion request to the President of CADE’s Tribunal, which will submit the request for the approval by CADE’s Tribunal.

5.1.5 In case the request is accepted by CADE’s Tribunal, copies of the adhesion request and the decision that accepted it will be attached to the case records of the Administrative Proceeding No. [

5.2 The present clause does not prevent an Employee from filing its own application for negotiation of a Settlement Agreement under new conditions.

5.2.1 The proposal indicated in Clause 5.2 implies the termination of the right to join this Agreement, provided for in this clause.

5.2.2 The rejection of the request to join this Agreement does not affect the ability of the Employee to request the negotiation of a new Agreement.

5.3 By joining this Agreement, the Employee will fully undertake the obligations set forth in Clauses 3.2 and 3.3.

5.3.1 The obligation set forth in Clause 3.2.1. may be achieved through the herein Committing Parties.

5.4 With the adhesion, the Employee will undertake to pay a pecuniary contribution to the FDDD, under the following criteria:
5.4.1. Employees that held positions of management in any entity belonging to the [___] Group at the time of the facts under investigation will be obliged to pay a value of [___] if the request for joining the Settlement is filed until (6) six months after the publication in the Official Gazette of the decision that approved this Settlement by CADE’s Tribunal; or R$ [___], if after this date.

5.4.2. The remaining Employees that are not included in Clause 5.4.1 will be obliged to pay a value of [___] if the request for joining the Settlement is filed until (6) six months after the publication in the Official Gazette of the decision that approved this Settlement by CADE’s Tribunal; or R$ [___], if after this date.

5.4.3 The values must be paid in up to 60 (sixty) days after the publication in the Official Gazette of the granting of the request for joining the Settlement, by CADE’s Tribunal.

5.4.4 In order to demonstrate the payment of the pecuniary contribution an authenticated copy of the proof of payment must be presented to CADE within 15 (fifteen) days after payment.

5.5 This clause will be effective (i) for 1 (one) year from the publication in the Official Gazette of the decision that approved this Settlement by CADE’s Tribunal or (ii) until the end of the legal term for the presentation of the Employee’s defense, in case the last term is longer than the first.

5.6 The value established on Clause 3.1 already includes the amount related to the payment of the adhesion of the Employees listed on Attachment IV of Restricted Access, calculated according to the provision contained on Clause 5.4 above.

5.6.1 In order to the Employees listed on Attachment IV to do justice to the provision of Clause 5.8., they shall formalize the adhesion request within 3 (three) months from the publication in the Official Gazette of the decision that approved this Settlement by CADE’s Tribunal, as well as be deemed as notified of his eventual inclusion in the Administrative Proceeding No. [___] as a Defendant and/or Administrative Proceeding initiated to investigate the same facts;

5.6.2 CADE shall not, in any circumstance, reimburse the Committing Parties for the amount paid in relation to Clause 5.6.

5.7 The adhesion request granted by CADE’s Tribunal implies in the recognition, by the Employee, of his involvement in the conduct under investigation, under the terms of Clause 2 and the History of Conduct attached to this Agreement.

5.8 The adhesion of the Employee to the present Agreement implies on the suspension and eventual closing of the Administrative Proceeding initiated to analyze
the facts under investigation, in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth on Clause 4.

5.8.1 The non-compliance with the Agreement by any individual or company covered by the scope of Clause 5 does not affect, in any way, the compliance by the others.

5.9 The Committing Parties will make their best efforts to communicate all their employees and former employees involved in the investigated facts concerning the possibility of adhering to this Settlement Agreement if such employees and former employees are indicated by CADE as defendants in this investigation within the term provided for under Clause 5.5 above.

Clause 6 - Non-compliance with the Agreement

6.1. Any eventual non-compliance with this Agreement by the Committing Parties or by any Employee that may have joined the Agreement, under the terms of Clause 5, must necessarily be declared by CADE’s Tribunal, after a due investigative process, in the case records of Request No [__], in which the Committing Parties or the Employee that allegedly failed to comply will have the right to full defence to demonstrate compliance, including the possibility of presenting evidence.

6.2. Once assessed, by CADE’s Tribunal, the non-compliance with any of the obligations established in Clause 3 of this Agreement, Administrative Proceeding No. [__] will be resumed in relation to the Committing Party or the Employee that failed to comply, guaranteeing the right to defence in the course of the investigations, under the same conditions of the remaining defendants and under the terms of the law.

6.3. In the case of unjustified delay, without previous consent, in relation to the payment of the pecuniary contribution indicated in Clauses 3.1, or in relation to the filing of the proof of payment indicated in Clause 3.1.2, for less than thirty (30) days counting from the due date, the Committing Parties will be subject, exclusively, to a daily fine in the value of R$ 10,000 (ten thousand reais).

6.4. In the case of unjustified delay, without previous consent, in relation to the payment of the pecuniary contribution indicated in Clauses 5.4, or in relation to the filing of the proof of payment indicated in Clause 5.4.4, for less than thirty (30) days counting from the due date, the Employee will be subject, exclusively, to a daily fine in the value of R$ 1,000 (one thousand reais).

6.5. In the case of unjustified delay, without previous consent, in relation to the payment of the pecuniary contribution, for more than thirty (30) days, counting from the due date, will be considered negligence of the Committing Parties or the Employee, resulting in the declaration of full non-compliance with this agreement by CADE’s Tribunal.
6.6 The declaration of full non-compliance with this Agreement will result in a fine to [ ] in default in the amount of R$ 100,000 (one hundred thousand reais) and to other Committing Parties in the amount of R$ 10,000 (ten thousand reais).

Clause 7 – Enforcement

7.1. This Agreement is an out-of-court enforcement instrument, under the terms of Article 85, paragraph 8, of Law No. 12529/2011.

Clause 8 – Publication

8.1. The Settlement Agreement will be disclosed at the moment of its review by CADE’s Tribunal, and it will be made public after its approval, under the terms of article 85, paragraph 7, of Law No. 12,529/11, guaranteeing confidentiality of the terms of the negotiation.

Clause 9 – Notifications

9.1 All notifications and other communications in relation to the Committing Parties shall be addressed to:

[ ]

And because the Parties agree, they sign this Agreement in the electronic way, with 2 (two) witnesses designated below:

Brasília,

By Cade:

By the Committing Parties:

Witnesses:
### ATTACHMENT I

**History of Conduct**

*(RESTRICTED ACCESS)*

### ATTACHMENT II

**Details on the Committing Parties’ Contributions**

*(RESTRICTED ACCESS)*

### ATTACHMENT III

**Complementary Contribution (Leniency Plus)**

*(RESTRICTED ACCESS)*

### ATTACHMENT IV

**Adhesion to the Cease and Desist Agreement No. [XX]/2016**

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<table>
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<th>[Cidade, XX de XX de 201X.]</th>
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<tr>
<td>[Cidade, XX de XX de 201X.]</td>
<td>[City, XX de XX de 201X.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ref.: <strong>Requerimento nº [●]</strong></td>
<td>Re.: <strong>Requirement No. [●]</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prezados(as) Senhores(as),</td>
<td>Dear Sir/Madam,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eu, [●], nacionalidade [●], CPF nº [●], I, [●], national citizen of [●], IRS enrolment nº [●], with [office/home] address at [●], city of [●], State of [●], reconheço que li e entendi os termos do Termo de Compromisso de Cessação nº XX/201X, assinado pela empresa [●], XX/201X], executed by the Company [●] with CADE, related to the market of [●].
Informo, ainda, que exerci o cargo/função de [•] na empresa [•] durante o período abrangido pela investigação do CADE, enquadrando-me, portanto, na cláusula [•]. Eu também corroboro os fatos relatados no Histórico da Conduta com relação a esse período.

Por meio deste documento, eu aceito e concordo em estar vinculado a todos os termos e condições estabelecidos no Termo de Compromisso de Cessação nº [XX/201X], especialmente as obrigações estabelecidas na Cláusula Quinta e a admissão da Cláusula Segunda.

Em cumprimento das disposições do Termo de Compromisso de Cessação nº [XX/201X], e como anexos a este documento, apresento: (i) cópia autenticada dos meus documentos pessoais de identificação [e (ii) procuração outorgada ao meu advogado].

Atenciosamente,

[Assinatura do Aderente] // [Signature of Adhering]

[Procuração, se assinado por advogado] // [Power-of-attorney, if executed by legal counsel]